14 October 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Director of Personnel
Comptroller
Inspector General

25X1　　FROM:

Executive Director

SUBJECT: Long-Range Planning Phase III Summary

　　　1.　Forwarded herewith is the Summary Report for Phase III of our long-range planning process, prepared by the Planning Staff; it includes:

　　　　-- a review of programmatic guidance resulting from the Intelligence Capabilities in 1985 study,

　　　　-- a summary of Phase III proposals for improving capabilities,

　　　　-- the implications of these proposals,

　　　　-- proposed long-range goals, and

　　　　-- strategy options.

I would like to have your preliminary reaction to this paper and your views on the need, if any, for an EXCOM meeting by 22 October 1982.

　　　2.　This paper is also intended to serve as preliminary guidance to the Phase IV teams on R&D, Support, and Personnel. On the basis of preliminary discussions with the Planning Staff, the Phase IV planning teams have already started by analyzing the individual Phase III studies for impact on their team. I think this paper provides a good basis for focusing the Phase IV effort, especially in the support and personnel areas.

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ARE REMOVED

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3. Phase IV will bring us closer to real world decisions. Quite obviously, the arithmetic sums which are emerging, whether of position or dollar totals, are not sustainable, or desirable. Prioritizing and reallocation versus sheer growth, attention to selection of manpower; some form of performance measurement, cross-directorate coordination -- all these are part of the dialogue.

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Attachment

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

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FROM:

Chief, HRPS/OP
1012 Ames Bldg.

EXTENSION | NO.

DATE
20 October 1982

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DD/OP-PA&E 1006 Ames				It would appear that an ExCom meeting on the referenced paper would be useful to more clearly define the preferred resource parameters noted in the strategy options.
2.				
3. EA/OP 5E58 Hqs	2 1 OCT 1982			Several aspects of the summary paper are of obvious OP critical interest. The item noted in the HUMINT Targets section which identifies the need for increased
4.				
5. DD/OP 21 OCT 1982				officers will obviously impact on how OP goes about its recruitment. It is assumed that this comment relates to a need for recruits with
6.				
7. D/OP 20 OCT 1982				The HUMINT Staff section indicates a major need for improvements in personnel management, and the CAREER INCENTIVE Long-Range Goals section identifies
8.				the need to implement a unique CIA career corps. After seeking clarification from ☐ it
9.				
10.				would appear that these comments related to the felt need for more inter- and intra- Directorate rotations and the development of an
11.				Agency unique salary scale.
12.				
13.				Many of the numbers relating to staff increases seem to differ slightly depending upon which section of the paper or attachment is being read. However, a ten-year
14.				increase in Agency staffing in the neighborhood of ☐ is consistently referred to in the
15.				Phase III Summary paper. In

(Cont'd)

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addition, the section concerning
Alternative Strategies outlines
the possible political expedience
of limiting the staff increases to
about [ ] Obviously, the sooner 25X1
we can begin to focus on a strategy,
the firmer OP can be concerning the
derivative impact on our resources 25X1
and the extent of additional
resources required.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE	
TO: Director of Personnel		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	

REMARKS:

FROM:

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

(47)

FORM NO. **241**
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

CIA's Long-Range Intelligence Capabilities

A Summary of Phase III

1. Scope: This paper summarizes the five Phase III Long-Range Planning studies on analytical, counterintelligence, covert action, HUMINT, and technical collection capabilities. It describes the major themes that are common to all the papers and suggests strategy alternatives based on these studies and the judgment on the relative value of additive improvement expressed in NFIP guidance for the FY 1984-88 time frame. This paper is also intended as guidance for the Phase IV planning teams on personnel, support, research and development, and Agency-wide management.

2. Guidance: The 1985 Intelligence Capabilities study highlighted the major DCI intelligence goals and objectives (summarized at attachment A and B respectively) and pointed to near- and mid-term improvements that could be made to meet them. The D/NFAC, in conjunction with Intelligence Producers Council members, evaluated the relative priority for making additional improvements in effort on each of the substantive challenges described in the 1985 Intelligence Capabilities study. These judgments were reflected in Intelligence Community guidance to the development of the 1984-88 NFIP (attachment C). This guidance places emphasis on improvement against Third World, Economic, Traditional Allies, and Unconventional Threats (terrorism, nuclear proliferation, narcotics, etc.), while continuing to make improvements in other areas.

The Phase II 10-year forecast of intelligence needs and priorities illustrates the need to re-examine our analytic and collection capabilities across the full range of intelligence problems (with differing priorities on specific informational needs within each target area, in accordance with DCID 1/2). The results of Phase II include the need for priority emphasis on the nuclear proliferation, terrorism, Soviet leadership succession, Muslim resurgence, Third World instability, technology transfer, and international economic problems.

3. Capability Proposals: The proposals for new capabilities created by the Phase III teams include general strategies, generic improvements, organizational relations, and activities related to specific targets. This section summarizes the proposals in terms of the individual papers and aggregate needs.

Individually the studies include general strategy proposals and areas for specific improvements:

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ANALYTICAL CAPABILITIES

<u>The principal goals for analysis will be to increase the size of work force with emphasis on selected targets, implementation of major ADP improvements, and provision of a more adequate analyst working environment.</u>

<u>Targets</u>: The priority activities will be:

-- continued primary emphasis on Soviet
   military threat
-- expanded research on Third World topics and
   new work on an indepth data base
-- more intense effort on the Soviet
   economy with emphasis on the defense
   section   25X1
-- nuclear proliferation

<u>People</u>: The study proposes an increase in the analytical staff of about [   ] over the 1982 strength,   25X1 including additional area analysts, economists, scientists/engineers, military analysts, and methodologists. A critical factor in getting the benefit of this increase is adequate space.

<u>ADP</u>: The study stresses the acquisition of reliable, responsive ADP equipment for word processing, automatic entry of large data volumes, on-line editing, etc. The ultimate goal is to provide a communications, data handling, and word processing capability for every analyst.

<u>Methodologies</u>: The study stresses the continuation of the implementation of methodologies to help analyst identify trends, provide forecasts, bridge information gaps, and provide early warning. Needs are expressed for techniques that allow computer simulations of economic, political, social and demographic factors with variations relevant to particular targets. Methods for analyzing expected new types of imagery are needed as are computer aids for manipulating large volumes of data.

<u>Training</u>: In addition to continuing emphasis on language training, the Third World-related target papers note the necessity for strong support by DoD for training military analysts and for opportunities for field trips to military-related facilities. Increasing in-country familiarization continues as a major objective.

<u>External Liaison</u>: Analysts will increasingly look to other agencies such as State, Treasury, and Commerce

for reporting on economic and other kinds of data. It will also be important for State to facilitate in-country experience for area analysts.

HUMINT

Additional operations officers are requested for all targets but stress is placed on improvements in qualitative factors, such as personnel management, language training, liaision with other CIA and Community elements, ADP, and technical support.

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
CAREER INCENTIVES

Goal: Implement a unique CIA career corps structure
which will be attractive to potential high quality
careerists, and provide incentive for continued service by
our existing staff.

INVESTMENT STRATEGY

Goal: Adopt a quantitative method for determining the
priorities for investments against the area and topical
intelligence targets.

As noted earlier in this paper, aggregate personnel
requests, including an assumed proportionate increase in
support, lead to an Agency of about [   ] people in the   25X1
1990's. This is consistent with results of the
Intelligence Capabilities in 1985 study (approximately
[   ] positions by 1990), and with the 1984 budget
estimate which projects CIA strength at [   ] in 1988.   25X1

The impact of these numbers on housing, ADP,
communications and other support factors have not yet
been established. But these impacts, potential future
resource constraints, and general questions of
manageability may lead to the conclusion that CIA should
not or cannot get that big. Under these circumstances,
we would need to make quantitative judgments on how to
distribute bounded resources. The data made available
in the Phase III studies was not intended to be used for
this purpose.

The Intelligence Capabilities in 1985 study and its
follow-on survey provide qualitative priorities; that is
a list of the targets in priority order for investment.
The survey does not show, for instance, the incremental
benefit of additional resources against a particular
target. The Intelligence Community Staff guidance for

the 1984 program incorporates these priorities and goes further in stating priorities for generic programmatic needs (analysts, HUMINT officers, equipment, etc.). None of these sources deal with the problem of what magnitude of increase is needed, what improvement would be expected, etc. We will need to be able to do this if we continue to expand our responsibilities for topics and countries and/or have to deal with resource constraints.

Some options for dealing with these problems are:

(1) Acquire a sophisticated investment methodology from a commercial source. Much work has been done in this area; and a number of systems are readily available. The cost of acquisition varies considerably and would include some dedicated time from analysts, operations officers, and managers. The results would serve to point out the relative merits of proposed options for further management consideration.

(2) Devise an informal methodology in-house. This would involve creating proposals for increased resources on the area and topical targets, quantitative surveys to assess the expected improvement in capability, and knowledge of the problem priority. These factors could be combined to produce a figure of merit for an investment proposal. The methodology would serve as a framework for displaying the relative merits of selected resource options. Final decisions would be made by the usual EXCOM review process.

6. Alternative Strategies: Based on the information provided so far in the planning process, several alternative investment strategies are identified:

a. Alternative A: Aim for growth in Agency manpower to about [_____] positions by 1992, apportion these positions in a manner similar to the FY 1984 program, and strive for paced qualitative improvements in automation, technical systems, and management.

b. Alternative B: Aim for growth in Agency manpower to about [_____] positions in 1993, but reapportion the increases beyond FY 1984 to those high priority areas that are described in the Phase II and Phase III studies -- nuclear proliferation, Third World stability, international economics, etc.; and strive for paced qualitative improvements in automation, technical collection, and management.

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   c. Alternative C: Hold the growth in Agency personnel positions to the FY 1984 level of ☐ maintain the FY 1984 apportionment of these positions, and strive for paced qualitative improvements.

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   d. Alternative D: Same as Alternative C, except for reapportioning positions by FY 1992 to emphasize efforts on specific high-priority problems.

   e. Alternative E: Hold personnel strength for FY 1992 to the proposed FY 1984 level of ☐ reapportion positions by FY 1992 to emphasize efforts on specific high-priority problems and accelerate efforts on qualitative improvements in automation, technical systems, and management.

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TAB S

STATEMENT OF DCI GOALS

GOAL 1: To Increase Access to the Political, Military, and
Economic Policies and Intentions of the Soviet Leadership (U)

    The USSR will remain the principal foreign challenge to the
US during the 1985-1990 time frame. To support US policy
formulation and implementation, accurate and reliable intelligence
is required on the political, military, and economic policies and
intentions of the Soviet political leadership and on the
individuals participating in this decision process. This will be
particularly important during the Soviet leadership transition
expected during this decade. (C)

GOAL 2: To Acquire More Timely Information on the Design of
Soviet Strategic and General Purpose Weapons (U)

    Accurate and reliable intelligence is required on the design
of Soviet strategic and general purpose weapons and weapons
systems developments as early as possible, preferably in the
design bureau stage of development, in order to provide
sufficient lead time to the US weapons systems acquisition
process. Intelligence on Soviet weapons development which could
effectively alter the balance of power is particularly
critical. (S)

GOAL 3: To Gain Increased Understanding of Soviet War-Fighting
Doctrine, Strategy, and Plans (U)

    Accurate and reliable intelligence is required on Soviet
war-fighting doctrine, strategy, and plans. (C)

GOAL 4: To Improve Our Arms Control Treaty Monitoring and
Verification Capability (U)

    Accurate and reliable intelligence is required on Soviet
military weapons and weapons systems developments and deployments
in order to support US arms control verification and
negotiations. (S)

GOAL 5: To Enhance Our Capabilities for Providing Indications
and Warning (U)

    Reliable intelligence on deployments of Soviet and Soviet-
surrogate military forces, especially against US and allied

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forces, is required for indications and warning of impending
hostilities.

GOAL 6:   To Create a Comprehensive, Worldwide Intelligence
Foundation: Data Base and Analytic Capability   (U)

        In order to ensure the US a capability to anticipate and
respond to major contingency throughout the world, particularly
in geographic areas not normally of major interest to the US, a
worldwide intelligence foundation is required to permit rapid and
knowledgeable augmentation in the event of a crisis involving US
interests.   This encyclopedic data base must be sufficiently
comprehensive to provide US policymakers initial current
intelligence and accurate estimates on the political, economic,
societal, geographic, scientific and technological, and military
characteristics and capabilities of the country together with its
changing alliances and interdependencies.   It should be of
sufficient scope and depth to permit rapid and effective
targeting of additional intelligence resources against the
area.   (C)

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[blank boxed area]

GOAL 9:   To Improve Intelligence Support to General Nuclear War   (U)

The US requires the capability to provide timely, reliable intelligence support to the National Command Authority (NCA) in the event of imminent or actual nuclear hostilities. This encompases the assured and continuing capability to assess the enemy's war-fighting capabilities, to provide intelligence for the conduct of military operations necessary to attain political objectives, and to support negotiations to terminate the conflict. (S)

GOAL 10:   To Enhance Our Ability to Provide Intelligence on Terrorism, Espionage, and International Illegalities   (C)

Given the ease of mobility worldwide and the increased US involvement and interdependence throughout the world, it will become increasingly difficult to protect the US and its citizens from terrorism, espionage, and other international illegalities. To formulate and implement effective security and countermeasure policies and to support US counteroperations when necessary, intelligence is required on organizations, plans, finances, personnel, and techniques intended for use by foreign governments and violent revolutionary organizations against US personnel and facilities. The following areas are of particular concern: espionage and other clandestine intelligence activities, terrorism, narcotics trafficking and finances, evasions of US export controls, and circumvention of US laws governing arms transfers, trade, and business practices. (S/NF)

GOAL 11:   To Provide Surge Capability   (U)

Recent crises involving US interests have required comprehensive and timely intelligence on geographic areas not routinely covered in depth by the Intelligence Community. The US requires the intelligence collection and analytic surge capability and flexibility to conduct intelligence operations for an extended period of time against contingency situations of a magnitude comparable to those conducted against Iran during the hostage crisis without seriously degrading the efforts against continuing high-priority intelligence targets. (S)

GOAL 12: To Enhance Manpower Talent and Productivity (U)

   Intelligence analysis and production remain a manpower intensive effort. Methods must be found during the remainder of this decade to ensure intelligence access to the necessary talents and skills. The shortage of linguists and regional analysts will be particularly critical, but engineers and technical specialists will also be in short supply. Ways must be found both to increase the skilled manpower available and to improve the productivity of available personnel. (C)

GOAL 13: To Improve Intelligence Communications (U)

   Communications facilities and procedures are required to ensure the proper flow of the vast quantities of data from US intelligence collection systems and at the same time ensure timely, tailored intelligence support to the various US intelligence users, including military commanders worldwide. (S)

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SUBJECT: Guidance for the Formulation of the National Foreign
Intelligence Program FY 1984-1988   (U)

PRIORITIES

As an aid in preparing programs for FY 1984-1988, the
following priorities for improvements are provided. They are not
intended as a statement of the importance of each target in an
absolute sense, nor are they a commentary on the current resource
distribution of base capabilities. Rather, they are intended as
a general guide to how new investments should be focused. They
are based on the collective views of DIA, INR, CIA, and NSA
producers, and represents their judgment of where additive
improvements would be most beneficial. I have divided these into
two categories. The first category is those activities which
require major new efforts to build needed capabilities: (S/NF)

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The second category is activities already receiving considerable
effort, but which still require improvement to achieve desired
capabilities: (S)

First   Indications and Warning
Second   Soviet Intentions and R&D
Third   Intelligence Support
            in General Nuclear War

While these general priorities are a guide to the overall
NFIP, individual programs will obviously stress different aspects
of these topics because of their particular focus and strengths,
e.g., the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) and the I&W
problem.   (S)

As further assistance, the producer community has expressed
its viewpoint for the priorities of generic programmatic
priorities (attached). These priorities agree in general with
the DCI'S goals and objectives, and I commend it for your
consideration in the development of your program.   (U)

GENERIC PROGRAMMATIC PRIORITIES

PRIORITY 1

Analysts -- the Community must have more intelligence production analysts and associated support. (S)

HUMINT -- substantially increased overseas resources, both clandestine and overt, together with administrative and communications support. (S)

Data Processing and Exploitation -- new collection capabilities must be matched by efficient means for using the acquired data. (S)

Training -- existing and new analyst resources will benefit from specialized training, especially overseas assignments for area/cultural familiarization. (S)

Telecommunications -- major upgrades are needed. (S)

Linguists -- there is a serious shortage for all areas of the world. (S)

PRIORITY 2

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PRIORITY 3

Foreign Hardware Acquisition -- a comprehensive, innovative, and imaginative hardware collection program should be encouraged and fostered. (S)

Recruiting -- improved recruiting techniques and incentives are now needed, and will be needed even more as position authorization increases. (S)

Working Space -- increased positions will further exacerbate current space limitations. (S)

PRIORITY 4

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External research (S)

ADP facilities (S)